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R. v. Smith and Judicially Reviewing
the Scope of Criminal Law
under the Charter
Christopher Sherrin*

I. INTRODUCTION
In R. v. Smith,1 the Supreme Court of Canada assessed the constitutionality of criminal prohibitions against the possession of marijuana in
light of regulations that carved out a medical exception exclusively for
dried marijuana. The Court held that the exception was too narrow and
declared the criminal prohibitions of no force and effect to the extent that
they prohibit a person with a medical authorization from possessing
marijuana derivatives for medical purposes.2
Smith was the Court’s first real foray into the lengthy saga of medical
marijuana Charter3 litigation4 and, at first glance, its decision appears to
reflect a banal application of established law to a factual finding at trial.
The Ontario Court of Appeal had decided 15 years earlier in R. v. Parker
that it violated section 7 of the Charter to deprive an individual, by
means of a criminal sanction, of access to marijuana reasonably required
for the treatment of a serious medical condition.5 The Supreme Court
simply applied that principle to the factual finding that, in some cases,
*

Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario.
[2015] S.C.J. No. 34, 2015 SCC 34 (S.C.C.), varg [2014] B.C.J. No. 2097 (B.C.C.A.)
[hereinafter “Smith SCC”].
2
By marijuana derivatives, the Court was referring to products containing the active
medicinal compounds extracted from the marijuana plant.
3
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
4
Most of the history of the litigation is outlined in R. Solomon & M. Clarizio, “The Highs
and Lows of Medical Marijuana Regulation in Canada” (2015) 62 Crim. L.Q. 536. The history also
includes the latest decision from the Federal Court in Allard v. Canada, [2016] F.C.J. No. 195, 2016
FC 236 (F.C.T.D.). Prior to Smith, the Supreme Court’s involvement was limited to denying leave to
appeal in a couple of cases.
5
R. v. Parker, [2000] O.J. No. 2787, 49 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), varg [1997] O.J. No. 4923
(Ont. Prov. Div.).
1
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non-dried marijuana is reasonably required for the treatment of some
medical conditions.
Scratching below the surface, however, uncovers issues that call into
question the legitimacy of the Court’s decision to override the
government’s regulatory choice. The trial record in Smith was
problematic: the evidence regarding the medical benefits of marijuana
derivatives was of questionable reliability; it was sometimes unclear
what evidence had been accepted by the trial judge; the value of some
of the evidence was open to question; the significance of some of the
findings at trial was debatable; some significant issues were largely
ignored. These problems raised some important matters for the
Supreme Court to discuss, but its judgment failed to address a
surprising number of them. What is open to criticism in the Court’s
judgment in Smith, therefore, is not so much the outcome or the
discrete conclusions that led to it (although a couple of them were a
little curious) as the extent to which the judgment overlooked issues
and smoothed over problems in the record.
In a constitutional democracy, judicial review of the acceptable
scope of the criminal law is entirely appropriate. But its legitimacy
depends critically on courts engaging in a careful, comprehensive, and
rigorous review of the evidence tendered and arguments made in
support of (and against) a constitutional claim. In a constitutional
democracy, the members of the public deserve no less. Regretfully, and
with great respect, it is not apparent that in Smith we quite got what we
deserved.

II. R. v. SMITH
Owen Smith worked for the Cannabis Buyers Club of Canada. The
Club sold marijuana and marijuana products to people who the Club
deemed had a medical condition for which marijuana might provide
relief.6 It sold not only dried marijuana for smoking, but edible and
topical marijuana products — cookies, gel capsules, rubbing oil, topical
patches, butters and lip balms. Smith’s job was to help produce those
marijuana derivatives by extracting the active compounds from the
marijuana plant.
6
For purposes of this article, I will eschew references to the scientific terminology used to
refer to marijuana and its preparations and derivatives. Nothing turns on terminological precision so
I will simply use the colloquial but familiar term “marijuana”.
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In December 2009, the police found Smith in possession of dried
marijuana as well as cookies, massage oils, and lip balms that contained
tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”), the main active compound in marijuana.
He was charged with possession of marijuana and with possession of
THC for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to sections 4 and 5 of the
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“CDSA”).7
Smith defended the charges on the basis that the offence provisions
were unconstitutional, being in violation of section 7 of the Charter. His
argument was that the CDSA did not provide an adequate exemption for
possession of marijuana for medical purposes. At the relevant time, the
Marihuana Medical Access Regulations (“MMARs”) promulgated under
the CDSA8 only authorized medically approved individuals to possess
dried marijuana. Smith argued that for the exemption to be constitutional
it had to extend beyond dried marijuana to medically required marijuana
derivatives. Smith did not use medical marijuana himself, and the
club for which he worked did not have a production licence under the
MMARs.9
Smith’s argument succeeded at trial and on appeal. The trial judge
declined to stay the proceedings after the Charter ruling but Smith was
acquitted because the Crown elected to call no evidence. The Crown was
not permitted to reopen its case following its unsuccessful appeals.
The Supreme Court held that the criminal prohibition against
possession of marijuana derivatives infringed the liberty and security of
the person interests, protected by section 7 of the Charter, of both Smith
and medical marijuana users. Most significantly, the Court held that the
prohibition against possession of marijuana derivatives “for medical
purposes limits liberty by foreclosing reasonable medical choices
through the threat of criminal prosecution … . Similarly, by forcing a
person to choose between a legal but inadequate treatment and an illegal
but more effective choice, the law also infringes security of the
person.”10
That holding was key to the entire decision. The Crown argued that
the evidence led at trial established only that some individuals preferred
7

S.C. 1996, c. 19.
SOR/2001-227 [repealed by s. 267 of and replaced by SOR/2013-119].
9
Smith was held to have standing to make the argument on the basis that accused persons
have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the law they are charged under, even if the alleged
unconstitutional effects are not directed at them and even if the remedy for the constitutional
deficiency will not necessarily end the charges against them: supra, note 1, at para. 12.
10
Supra, note 1, at para. 18.
8
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oral and topical marijuana treatments, not that the treatments had any
therapeutic benefit. The Court responded as follows:
… This submission runs counter to the findings of fact made by the trial
judge. After a careful review of extensive expert and personal evidence,
the trial judge concluded that in some circumstances the use of cannabis
derivatives is more effective and less dangerous than smoking or
otherwise inhaling dried marihuana. A trial judge’s conclusions on issues
of fact cannot be set aside unless they are unsupported by the evidence or
otherwise manifestly in error ... . The evidence amply supports the trial
judge’s conclusions on the benefits of alternative forms of marihuana
treatment; indeed, even the Health Canada materials filed by the Crown’s
expert witness indicated that oral ingestion of cannabis may be
appropriate or beneficial for certain conditions.
… While it is not necessary to conclusively determine the threshold for
the engagement of s. 7 in the medical context, we agree with the
majority at the Court of Appeal that it is met by the facts of this case.
The evidence demonstrated that the decision to use non-dried forms of
marihuana for treatment of some serious health conditions is medically
reasonable.11

Once the Court accepted the medical benefits of marijuana
derivatives, everything else quickly followed. The primary objective of
the restriction to dried marijuana was deemed to be the protection of
health and safety.12 Since using non-dried marijuana is, for some patients
who qualify for legal access to medical marijuana, more effective and
less dangerous as a treatment than inhaling dried marijuana, prohibiting
non-dried marijuana undermines rather than protects the health and
safety of medical marijuana users, rendering the prohibition arbitrary
and contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.13 For the same
11

Id., at paras. 19-20.
The Crown argued that, more specifically, the objective was the protection of health and
safety by ensuring that drugs offered for therapeutic purposes comply with the safety, quality and
efficacy requirements set out in the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27. The Court replied,
supra, note 1, at para. 24, that “[t]his qualification does not alter the object of the prohibition; it
simply describes one of the means by which the government seeks to protect public health and
safety. Moreover, the MMARs do not purport to subject dried marihuana to these safety, quality and
efficacy requirements, belying the Crown’s assertion that this is the object of the prohibition.” The
Crown argued that another objective of the regulatory restriction was to assist in combatting
diversion of medical marijuana into the illegal market. The Court quickly dismissed that argument as
unsupported by the evidence: supra, note 1, at para. 27.
13
Relying on Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72
(S.C.C.), varg [2012] O.J. No. 1296 (Ont. C.A.), the Court noted that a law is arbitrary if it imposes
limits on liberty or security of the person that have no connection to its purpose.
12
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reason, the regulatory restriction failed under section 1 of the Charter,
there being no rational connection between the means and the objective.
The Court declared the criminal prohibitions on possession of marijuana
in sections 4 and 5 of the CDSA of no force and effect, to the extent that
they prohibit a person with a medical authorization from possessing
marijuana derivatives for medical purposes.

III. THE TRIAL RECORD
In order to properly understand the Supreme Court’s decision in
Smith, it is necessary to understand the record on which the decision was
based. For that, one must refer to the trial decision of Johnston J.14
Justice Johnston made the following findings regarding the benefits of
using marijuana derivatives rather than dried marijuana in the course of
medical treatment:
●

For gastro-intestinal conditions such as Crohn’s disease or Irritable
Bowel Syndrome, oral ingestion of the main active compounds of
marijuana (THC and CBD)15 would “arguably” deliver the therapeutic
benefit more directly to the site of pathology.16

●

Oral ingestion prolongs the effects of the drug in a person’s system
and thus would be “better” for someone with a chronic condition of
pain or glaucoma, as some level of therapeutic dosage would remain
while the person slept.17

●

For someone who needs speedy assimilation of the active compounds,
spraying a solution containing those compounds under the tongue
can, like smoking dried marijuana, provide faster assimilation, but
without the health risks associated with smoking.18

Not a single scientific study is referenced in the trial judgment, or in
the judgments on appeal, in support of these findings. Justice Johnston
appeared to base his findings regarding the sometimes superior medical
benefits of marijuana derivatives almost exclusively on the testimony

14
[2012] B.C.J. No. 730, 2012 BCSC 544 (B.C.S.C.), vard [2014] B.C.J. No. 2097
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Smith Trial”].
15
THC, as noted above, is short for tetrahydrocannabinol. CBD is short for cannabidiol.
16
Supra, note 14, at para. 45.
17
Id., at para. 45.
18
Id., at para. 45.
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provided by the one expert witness called by the defence, Dr. David Pate.19
At the same time, he also offered some rather negative assessments of
Dr. Pate’s testimony:
●

While well-meaning and honest, Dr. Pate “strayed from objective
opinion into advocacy, and … appeared at times argumentative when
testifying”.20

●

A Crown expert’s criticism of Dr. Pate “for making assertions with
little scientific support was well taken”.21

●

“Dr. Pate seemed a bit too willing to accept some benefits of
cannabis products as possible, based on his common sense or
extrapolation from other evidence”.22

●

“The way in which Dr. Pate gave some of his evidence suggested
that he was both amused and frustrated by government attitudes
toward cannabis marihuana and its components, given its
pervasiveness in both the underground economy and its growing
acceptance as medicine. This has lessened the weight I put on
Dr. Pate’s evidence.”23

In addition to the findings regarding the relative benefits of marijuana
derivatives, the trial judge also found or accepted that:
●

Because of the slow build-up of the drug in the body with oral
ingestion, dosages are more difficult to manage, as it takes some time
to determine when the optimum therapeutic level has been reached.24

●

Oral ingestion has the “detriment of taking longer to build a
therapeutic level of the drug than would occur with smoking dried
marihuana”.25

●

Topical administration of the drug, by applying it directly to the site
of skin infections, or to inflamed joints, is controversial.26

19
All of the findings reproduced above were listed in a single paragraph, introduced by the
words: “From Dr. Pate’s evidence I accept”.
20
Supra, note 14, at para. 38. The same criticism was levelled against one of the Crown’s
expert witnesses.
21
Id., at para. 39. A similar criticism was made against one of the Crown’s expert witnesses.
22
Id., at para. 41.
23
Id., at para. 43.
24
Id., at para. 45.
25
Id., at para. 45.
26
Id., at para. 64.
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●

Smoking would be a better way to take a therapeutic dose of
marijuana in case of a sharp increase in pain or discomfort, although
smoking marijuana poses added health risks associated with inhaling
smoke.27

●

The precise basis for the therapeutic benefits of marijuana “is
masked to some extent by the belief set or faith with which many
medical users have approached their use, and has been made more
difficult to … measure by the historical proscriptions against
marihuana use”.28

IV. A WEAK RECORD RAISING MANY QUESTIONS
The trial record in Smith was not strong. The British Columbia Court
of Appeal twice noted that, beyond question, the evidentiary record in the
case was weaker than it was in the seminal case of Parker.29 The obvious
question is whether the record was strong enough. Was the evidence at
trial, and were the findings at trial, sufficient to establish a reasonable
need for marijuana derivatives in the treatment of serious medical
conditions?
The technical answer, of course, is that they were because they were
sufficient to establish, on a balance of probabilities, reasonable medical
need in the eyes of the trier of fact. But should the trial record have been
deemed sufficient, both by the trial judge and the judges on appeal? The
record in support of the applicant’s position may actually have been
stronger than is suggested by the trial judgment, but on its face the
judgment causes concern for a number of reasons.
There were obviously some credibility concerns with Dr. Pate’s
testimony; they were for the trial judge to resolve. Of greater interest is
the fact that there were also reliability concerns with Pate’s evidence.
He made at least some assertions with little scientific support. He was
too willing to accept as possible some benefits of cannabis products.
He sometimes took on the role of an advocate. He did not appear to rely
on scientific studies (at least to a degree significant enough to be worthy
of mention). He was forced, at least sometimes, to fall back on common
sense and extrapolation. Over and above all this, the trial judge noted that
27

Id., at para. 45.
Id., at para. 46.
29
R. v. Smith, [2014] B.C.J. No. 2097, 2014 BCCA 322, at paras. 94, 104 (B.C.C.A.),
varg [2012] B.C.J. No. 730 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Smith CA”].
28
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any evidence about the medical benefits of marijuana suffers from the
problem that the precise basis for those benefits is masked by faith and
the historical proscriptions against the use of marijuana.
The question naturally arises whether that was the sort of foundation
on the basis of which courts should be drawing conclusions regarding
medical facts that are mostly dispositive of a constitutional issue.30 The
lack of reference to supporting scientific studies is of particular note. In
the absence of research, one must typically rely, at least to some extent,
on untested suppositions, inferences, and extrapolations. I do not suggest
that sufficient proof can never be found in such reasoning, but its use
must, at the very least, command careful scrutiny of the assertions
advanced and the premises underlying them.
The trial judgment contains a rudimentary description of the basic
premises underlying Dr. Pate’s assertions but no dissection of the
premises nor any analysis of their validity. The Supreme Court’s decision
similarly contains no real discussion of the quantity and quality of the
evidence led at trial. The Court mostly just asserted that “[t]he evidence
amply supports the trial judge’s conclusions on the benefits of alternative
forms of marihuana treatment.”31 That is a rather surprising statement.
If the trial evidence in Smith was ample, one is left to wonder what sorts
of evidentiary frailties the Supreme Court would be willing to tolerate,
without discussion, when intruding on Parliament’s legislative authority
in criminal law.
The Supreme Court was comforted by Health Canada materials filed
at trial by the Crown’s expert witness. In the words of the Court, “even
the Health Canada materials … indicated that oral ingestion of cannabis
may be appropriate or beneficial for certain conditions.”32 That is a rather
limited assertion by Health Canada. The materials were not referenced in
any relevant way in the trial judgment but the judgment of the Court of
Appeal contains some added information. The materials refer to “some
possible” improvement in asthma patients.33 To say that oral ingestion
30
The adequacy of the evidentiary record was raised by the Crown on appeal, although it
focused more on the gaps in the evidentiary record rather than the reliability of the evidence that was
introduced. See id., at paras. 34 and 66. See also the Supreme Court’s judgment, supra, note 1, at
para. 19.
31
Supra, note 1, at para. 19.
32
Id., at para. 19.
33
Smith CA, supra, note 29, at para. 112. The Court wrote that “it is early days in terms of
conclusive clinical trials on the use of cannabis but the research that has been done is replete with
references to the benefits of orally ingested cannabis.” The example in the main text, however, was
the only one given.
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“may” be appropriate or produce “some possible” improvement seems to
add very little to the evidence in support of the medical benefits of
marijuana derivatives. It is curious that the Supreme Court thought to
attach any real significance to the materials.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal was clearly concerned about
the evidentiary record. In defence of the trial judge’s conclusions, it
elaborated at some length on the testimony given at trial. It paid
particular attention to the four “patient witnesses” called by the defence
who testified to their experiences administering marijuana orally and
topically to treat the diseases from which they suffered. The Court
explained that the witnesses found products made with marijuana more
effective in treating certain of their symptoms and disorders than
smoking dried marijuana.34 It noted that “[t]he relief they reported from
cannabis products was significant and, in some cases, life changing.”35
The Supreme Court similarly relied on the evidence of the patient
witnesses in upholding the trial decision.36
The appellate courts inferred that the trial judge accepted and relied
on the evidence of the patient witnesses in determining the medical
benefits of marijuana derivatives.37 That inference was technically
available; the trial judge did hold that, by limiting the patient witnesses
to using dried marijuana, the law interposed “the threat of criminal
prosecution between them and the form of medication found effective to
treat the symptoms of their very serious illnesses”.38 The inference,
however, was far from inevitable. The quoted statement was the only one
in the judgment suggesting that the trial judge accepted and relied on the
testimony of the patient witnesses in finding medical benefit. It was
included in the discussion of the law, roughly two-thirds of the way
through the judgment and long after the trial judge outlined the evidence
and described his findings regarding medical benefit. Indeed, when the
patient witnesses were first mentioned, the trial judge wrote that they
“testified as members of the Club who obtain products other than dried
marihuana”39 (rather than as people who claimed to derive medical
benefit from the products). The judge also seemed to accept that
34

Id., at para. 9.
Id., at para. 11.
36
See, e.g., supra, note 1, at paras. 19-20.
37
Smith CA, supra, note 29, at para. 95; Smith SCC, supra, note 1, at paras. 19-20.
38
Supra, note 14, at para. 89. I am assuming that the trial judge was referring to marijuana
derivatives having been found effective by the patient witnesses themselves, and not just by
someone like Dr. Pate.
39
Id., at para. 75.
35
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“[a]necdotal reports of the efficacy of cannabis products in the treatment
or management of various diseases and conditions should be approached
with some caution.”40 Even if, despite all that, one can still assume that
the trial judge accepted and relied on the testimony of the patient
witnesses, there was ambiguity as to exactly which parts of their
testimony he accepted. The trial judge clearly did not accept all the parts,
since the witnesses testified to benefits from topical administration of
marijuana41 but the trial judge did not find any medical benefits from
topical administration. The trial judgment contained no discussion, or
even description, of the testimony given by the patient witnesses
regarding the medical benefits of marijuana derivatives. The judge
referred to “the form of medication found effective” to treat the
symptoms of the witnesses’ illnesses, but he did not explain the ways in
which, or the extent to which, it was found to be effective. Surely some
of this was worthy of discussion on appeal before the testimony of the
patient witnesses was used to justify the trial judge’s findings regarding
medical benefit. Yet nowhere in the decision of the Supreme Court is
there mention of any of it.
Even assuming that the trial judge did accept and rely on the
testimony of the patient witnesses, it is not obvious their evidence added
much. Their evidence was anecdotal. It was not supported by any expert
medical evidence confirming that edible or topical forms of marijuana
were effective in treating their individual illnesses.42 All of the witnesses
smoked marijuana in addition to using it topically and ingesting it
orally,43 raising the concern that they may have mistakenly attributed
benefits from one form of administration to another. And their testimony
asserting medical benefits from topical administration clearly added
nothing, since no such benefits were ultimately found at trial. At the very
least, this necessitated that the witnesses’ evidence be dissected so as to
assess its value absent that aspect of their testimony — assuming that
was even possible.
The Supreme Court addressed one of these concerns. It held that
the absence of supporting medical evidence was not determinative.44
40
Id., at para. 62. It is not entirely clear whether, in this passage, the trial judge was simply
summarizing the evidence given by one of the Crown’s witnesses or was referring to a portion of the
witness’s evidence that he accepted.
41
See Smith CA, supra, note 29, at paras. 104, 107 and 109.
42
See id., at paras. 107-108.
43
See id., at para. 108.
44
Supra, note 1, at para. 20.
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Given the debatable significance of the patient witnesses’ testimony,
and the ambiguous manner in which the trial judge used it, that seems
like an inadequate analysis of the value and reliability of their anecdotal
evidence, and maybe of such evidence generally in Charter cases.45
Even more curious is the fact that the Court seemed to hold that the
evidence established a reasonable medical need for marijuana in topical
form. The Court held that the evidence “did more than establish a
subjective preference for oral or topical treatment forms”.46 It also struck
down the criminal prohibitions on possession of marijuana to the extent
that they prohibit authorized individuals from possessing all forms of
marijuana derivatives for medical purposes, rather than just orally
administered derivatives. All of this suggests some lack of rigour in
scrutinizing the evidence allegedly justifying intrusion upon Parliament’s
choice as to the scope of the criminal law.
The Supreme Court cited the need to defer to a trial judge’s
conclusions on issues of fact unless they are unsupported by the evidence
or otherwise manifestly in error.47 Although it was not specifically
mentioned, presumably the Court had in mind its pronouncement in
Bedford extending that well-established principle to cover findings
regarding social science evidence as well as adjudicative facts.48
Presumably as well, the Court was extending the holding in Bedford to
cover what can loosely be described as the “hard sciences”, like many of
the medical sciences, in which hypotheses can often be tested and
scientifically validated.49 It may be that the need for deference justifies
the failure of the Supreme Court to analyze in greater depth the reliability
and value of the evidence tendered to establish the medical benefits of
marijuana derivatives. But, given the apparent frailties of the evidence
and ambiguities as to which parts of it were accepted at trial, the laconic
approach of the Court in Smith comes across as a rather vigorous

45
In R. v. Mernagh, [2013] O.J. No. 440, 2013 ONCA 67, at paras. 63-65 (Ont. C.A.), leave
to appeal refused [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 136 (S.C.C.), the Ontario Court of Appeal offered some
thoughts about the value of anecdotal evidence in medical marijuana cases. It would have been
helpful to hear the Supreme Court’s thoughts on the issue.
46
Supra, note 1, at para. 20 (emphasis added).
47
Id., at para. 19.
48
Bedford, supra, note 12, at paras. 48-56. Adjudicative facts are the facts of the case at bar.
49
See R. v. Abbey, [2009] O.J. No. 3534, 2009 ONCA 624, 97 O.R. (3d) 330, at paras. 104-120
(Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 125 (S.C.C.), in which the Court discusses
the different types of sciences and the different criteria relevant to assessing their reliability.
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application of the principle of deference.50 As indicated by its extensive
review of the trial evidence (more extensive than is contained in the trial
judgment), the British Columbia Court of Appeal did not feel content to
rest on the need for deference.51 The approach of the Supreme Court also
seems inconsistent with the increasing trend to subject the reliability of
expert scientific testimony to greater scrutiny.52
Even if the Supreme Court was fully justified in deferring to the
factual findings of the trial judge, additional issues arose in light of what
was actually found. The trial judge found that, for gastro-intestinal
conditions, oral ingestion of the main active compounds of marijuana
would “arguably” deliver the therapeutic benefit more directly to the site
of pathology.53 Surely that is not a finding of any constitutional
significance. Surely Mr. Smith had to establish more than an arguable
medical benefit. Yet the Supreme Court cited this finding as one that
justified the ultimate conclusion that use of marijuana derivatives can be
of medical benefit.54 It is very hard to characterize this as a cautious and
careful approach to constitutional review.
The trial judge also found, more definitively, that oral ingestion of
marijuana compounds is better for a chronic condition of pain or
glaucoma. That may well be a finding of constitutional significance. But
the trial judge also found that dosages are more difficult to manage with
oral ingestion and that oral ingestion has the “detriment” of taking longer
to build a therapeutic level of the drug than would occur with smoking
dried marijuana.55 In other words, the trial judge found both benefits and
costs of oral ingestion. One can presumably infer that he also found that
50
The evidence in Bedford seemed materially stronger, including “personal evidence of the
applicants, the evidence of affiants and experts, and documentary evidence in the form of studies,
reports of expert panels and Parliamentary records”: supra, note 13, at para. 54.
51
See, e.g., Smith CA, supra, note 29, at paras. 9, 11, 44-52, 94-95, 104-115. The appeal
court’s decision post-dated the Supreme Court’s decision in Bedford.
52
See, e.g., White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., [2015] S.C.J.
No. 23, 2015 SCC 23, at para. 1 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] N.S.J. No. 259 (N.S.C.A.): “Expert opinion
evidence can be a key element in the search for truth, but it may also pose special dangers. To guard
against them, the Court over the last 20 years or so has progressively tightened the rules of
admissibility and enhanced the trial judge’s gatekeeping role.”
53
Supra, note 14, at para. 45.
54
The Court cited this finding near the start of its judgment when it summarized the
findings of the trial judge (although it said the judge found that oral ingestion “may” aid gastrointestinal conditions): supra, note 1, at para. 7. As discussed immediately below, the Court also cited
one other finding of medical benefit made by the trial judge. In the remainder of its decision, the
Court did not distinguish between the two findings, always discussing them collectively in
concluding that the evidence established medical benefit.
55
Supra, note 14, at para. 45.
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the benefits outweighed the costs, but that was a judgment call, not a
pure factual finding.56 It seemed to invite at least some brief discussion
of the competing considerations by the Supreme Court. Yet none was
offered.
Even if the findings at trial were sufficiently unambiguous as to
establish some medical benefit of marijuana derivatives, an issue remained
as to whether the findings, and the evidence led in support of them,
established enough of a benefit. There is ambiguity in the trial record
relating to the extent of the benefit derived from the use of marijuana
derivatives. The trial judge found that, for gastro-intestinal conditions, oral
ingestion would arguably deliver the therapeutic benefit “more directly to
the site of pathology”.57 A more direct delivery is presumably a better
delivery, but whether it is a significantly or marginally better delivery is
not clear. The judge also found oral ingestion would be “better” for
someone with a chronic condition of pain or glaucoma,58 but how much
better was left unexplored. The patient witnesses may have described a
substantial benefit from using marijuana derivatives,59 but the reported
record is not entirely clear60 and, as stated above, it is not clear that the trial
judge accepted all aspects of the patient witnesses’ testimony (regarding
oral ingestion). The case seemed ripe for some analysis of the degree of
benefit necessary to establish a constitutional claim. The Supreme Court,
however, did not specifically mention this issue, stating simply that
marijuana derivatives offer “more effective” treatment, to some undefined
degree.61 Perhaps any amount of benefit is constitutionally sufficient; it
seems like the compassionate position. But given the content of the lower
court judgments, some discussion of the necessary degree of benefit
seemed appropriate — at least to the extent of referring to a few more
details in the evidentiary record.
56
There was no indication in the trial decision, or in the judgment of the Court of Appeal,
that the judgment call was based on an opinion given by a witness.
57
Supra, note 14, at para. 45.
58
Id., at para. 45.
59
The Court of Appeal wrote, for example, that “the relief they [the patient witnesses]
reported from cannabis products was significant and, in some cases, life changing. In the words of
one witness, being able to use different forms of cannabis to treat her symptoms helped her ‘get her
life back’ from the debilitating effects of her illness”: supra, note 29, at para. 11.
60
From the information in the Court of Appeal’s decision, it is not always easy to determine
precisely what benefit the witnesses reported from administering marijuana orally and topically
rather than by smoking. The matter is further complicated by the fact that, in the absence of any
finding at trial of a medical benefit from topical use, any asserted benefit from such use would be
irrelevant.
61
Supra, note 1, at paras. 18 and 25.
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Arguably, the Court indirectly addressed the sufficiency of the
medical benefits from marijuana derivatives when it responded to the
Crown’s assertion that the evidence established nothing more than a
subjective preference by the patient witnesses for oral and topical
treatment forms. The Court wrote that “[w]hile it is not necessary to
conclusively determine the threshold for the engagement of s. 7 in the
medical context, we agree … that it is met by the facts of this case. The
evidence demonstrated that the decision to use non-dried forms of
marihuana for treatment of some serious health conditions is medically
reasonable.”62 That reflects some sort of consideration of the significance
of the available evidence. Unfortunately, it is also basically a statement
of a conclusion without any meaningful explanation of the reasons for it.
Even if the trial record established constitutionally significant medical
benefit from the use of marijuana derivatives, there still remained a
number of questions that received very little attention in all of the
judgments in Smith. They are questions that a responsible medical
practitioner would consider before prescribing medication. Are there any
possible side-effects? If so, what and potentially how serious are they?
Do we know anything about the effects of long-term use of the
medication? Do we know anything about the interaction of the
medication with other medications or treatments? Is there any risk of
adverse impact on medical conditions not to be treated by the medication
(but from which a patient using the medication may suffer)? An
individual only has a constitutional right to access medication reasonably
required for the treatment of a serious medical condition.63 Surely those
sorts of questions inform an analysis of whether medication is reasonably
required. I do not suggest that a court must have definitive, or extensive,
answers to those sorts of questions before finding reasonable medical
need, but on the face of the written record in Smith the courts knew
almost nothing about the answers, because no one seemed to be asking
the questions. The only thing that was clearly known was that the
psychoactive effects of marijuana are an unwanted side effect from a
medical point of view.64 No indication was given whether oral ingestion
removes this side-effect.

62

Id., at para. 20.
This precise standard was not clearly articulated either in Parker or in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Smith, but both judgments seem to apply that standard. See Parker, supra, note 5,
at paras. 103-104; Smith SCC, supra, note 1, at paras. 18 and 20.
64
Smith Trial, supra, note 14, at para. 45.
63
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That so much was, on the basis of the record, unknown about the use
of oral and topical marijuana products may have been partly behind the
Crown’s argument before the Supreme Court that there are health risks
associated with using such products, and thus that the restriction to dried
marijuana was justified on the basis that it restricted access to drugs to
only those shown by scientific study to be safe and therapeutically
effective.65 The Court responded to that argument as follows:
… The evidence accepted at trial did not establish a connection
between the restriction and the promotion of health and safety. As we
have already said, dried marihuana is not subject to the oversight of the
Food and Drugs Act regime. It is therefore difficult to understand why
allowing patients to transform dried marihuana into baking oil would
put them at greater risk than permitting them to smoke or vaporize
dried marihuana. Moreover, the Crown provided no evidence to suggest
that it would.66

This passage, like the Crown’s argument, is open to interpretation, but
it is a little concerning if it shows that the Court was willing to assume
there are no adverse consequences from oral and topical administration
of marijuana in the absence of any evidence that there are. That does not
exemplify a careful, rigorous approach to constitutional review. The
burden was on Mr. Smith to show reasonable medical need for marijuana
derivatives. Was the burden not also on him, therefore, to at least show
that there was no real cause for concern about adverse effects (even if the
Crown shared the obligation to address this issue)? The Supreme Court
was correct that dried marijuana has not been subject to regulatory
review for safety, but seems to ignore the fact that that is the result of a
court decision — a decision that left it to the government to design
appropriate (and constitutional) rules regulating access to marijuana.67
The Court also seems to ignore the possibility that transforming dried
marijuana into another product by mixing it with other components could
alter its chemical properties in ways that may be adverse to health.

V. CONCLUSION
I do not know whether a proper medical case can be made out for oral
and/or topical administration of marijuana derivatives. I cannot say
65
66
67

See supra, note 1, at paras. 24 and 26.
Id., at para. 26.
See Parker, supra, note 5, at paras. 202-203.
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exactly what issues the members of the Supreme Court contemplated in
coming to their decision in Smith. But I can say that, on the face of the
written record, the Court neglected to address a number of what appeared
to be live issues germane to the resolution of the constitutional issue.
That is troubling from the perspective of democratically appropriate
judicial review.
Perhaps I expect too much. Maybe it was not necessary for the
Supreme Court to address all of the issues identified in this article;
admittedly, some of them are less problematic than others. But I cannot
help but think it was necessary for the Court to address more of them
than it did.
It seems that the Crown evidence at trial did not assert any negative
effects from using marijuana derivatives.68 It is also true that the trial judge
found that adverse health effects can come from smoking marijuana.69
But neither fact relieved Mr. Smith from the burden of demonstrating
reasonable medical need for using marijuana derivatives (which could
come with their own dangers and be less effective than smoking
marijuana). Neither fact relieved the Court from the obligation to carefully
and rigorously scrutinize the finding of medical need.
R. v. Smith is just one case in a long and ever-expanding history of
constitutional review of the acceptable scope of criminal law. Its influence
in the long term may be negligible. But it was the first opportunity for our
highest court to demonstrate its approach to constitutional review in the
medical marijuana context. It is regretful that the judgment did not offer us
a little more.

68
69

See Smith CA, supra, note 29, at paras. 111 and 130.
Supra, note 14, at para. 45.

